Dear Ms. Porter,
On April 1, 2019, you published an investigative article for The New York Times titled “Chinese Dissidents Feel Heat of Beijing’s Wrath. Even in Canada.” The article drew strong criticism from readers and those directly involved.
That same month, you published a follow-up article, “A Chinese Activist and the Smear Campaign That Followed Her to Canada,” explaining that your reporting involved a "complicated subculture". You also described the responses on Twitter as "fierce and loud", saying they reflected how"fractious" the overseas dissident community is.
You characterized your critics collectively, yet did not address their specific factual questions. This approach of replacing substantive responses with broad labels prompted further criticism.
Woeser, a well-knownTibetan writer living in China who has long been subjected to surveillance and tracking by the Chinese authorities, posted a series of tweets that day questioning your portrayal of rational, fact-based criticism and accountability as"fractious" and "attacks". The prominent poet and writer Tang Danhong also pointed out that, as a journalist wielding considerable influence, you had harmed those involved through inaccurate and unfair reporting, yet portrayed yourself as a victim of a “subculture” when confronted with criticism. Moli, who was sentenced to three years in prison for publicly condemning the crackdown during the 1989 Tiananmen protests, also published an essay titled "Criticizing Sheng Xue: Defamation or Exposing the Truth?" pointing out inaccuracies and unfairness in your reporting.
I believe your reporting helped reinforce Sheng Xue’s image as a victim, making substantive criticism of her more likely to be framed as attacks on a victim. Since then, in response to increasingly serious questions about her conduct, Sheng has repeatedly resorted to insults and personal attacks rather than addressing the issues.
I do not believe a news article can determine an individual’s behavior, nor do I intend to attribute all of Sheng’s subsequent conduct to you. However, journalism has undeniable public influence. When reporting involves a politically charged narrative of persecution, journalists have an even greater responsibility to distinguish carefully between facts, inferences, and unsubstantiated attribution.
I am therefore writing this open letter to bring facts that have been obscured or unfairly presented back into public view, and to ask you and The New York Times to address these questions directly and accept the journalistic responsibility your reporting entails.
I. Conclusions Without Evidence: What Is the Connection Between Anonymous Harassment and Public Criticism Under Real Names?
Your article placed anonymous harassment and public criticism of Sheng Xue under the broader narrative of the Chinese Communist Party’s repression of overseas dissidents. Citing expert opinion, you suggested that "a coordinated attack by the Chinese Communist Party."
Anonymous harassment may involve sexual images and online intimidation. Public criticism under real names, by contrast, involves critics identifying themselves and raising specific questions that can be examined against the facts. These are fundamentally different forms of conduct. They cannot be treated as part of the same organized attack simply because they target the same person.
You wrote:
You also wrote that "Many of her attackers are former friends and colleagues." specifically mentioning me: "Ms. Zhu has penned many critical blog posts and assembled two e-books about Sheng Xue".
These accounts placed anonymous online harassment and critics speaking under their own names within the same narrative framework, without clearly establishing whether there was any factual connection between them.
Please answer:
What evidence do you have that the criticism by me (Zhu Rui) and others was connected to a coordinated attack by the Chinese Communist Party?
If no evidence establishes such a connection, why did you place these fundamentally different forms of conduct within the same narrative of a "coordinated attack by the Chinese Communist Party"?
Of particular note, in your follow-up article, you acknowledged that some of the creators of anonymous content were never identified. If so, on what basis did you attribute this content to a coordinated campaign by China?
I do not deny that the Chinese Communist Party may use anonymous online attacks, disinformation, and transnational harassment to target overseas dissidents. But that possibility cannot substitute investigating specific incidents, nor can it justify placing all critics within a narrative of CCP repression.
If you have evidence, you should explain the specific connections. If you do not, you should clearly distinguish anonymous harassment from public criticism under real names, rather than using suggestive framing that leads readers to believe that everyone who criticized Sheng Xue was involved in an organized campaign by the Chinese Communist Party.
Such associations, when unsupported by clear evidence, not only damage the reputations of critics but also suppress legitimate scrutiny of problems within the overseas Chinese democracy movement.
II. The Amnesty International Report: Did Sheng Xue Contribute Materials, and What Did the Report Actually Verify?
Your article stated:
"A confidential report by Amnesty International Canada had just been leaked, detailing the troubling experiences of 17 local activists. The person most cited was Sheng Xue."
Sheng Xue was then the president of the Federation for a Democratic China. On October 3, 2015, she published an article describing her participation, on behalf of the Federation, in a September 21 meeting between member organizations of the Canadian Coalition for Human Rights in China and Canada's Department of Foreign Affairs. The meeting took place at Amnesty International Canada's office. She also described presenting her own experiences of online attacks, harassment, and intimidation at that meeting.
I am not suggesting that Sheng directed or controlled the report. However, whether she participated in collecting materials, recommending interviewees, or submitting information is clearly a legitimate question that warrants clarification.
I ask you and Amnesty International to answer the following:Was Sheng one of the 17 people interviewed?
Did she directly submit materials concerning alleged harassment, defamation, or online attacks against herself, either in her personal capacity or as a representative of the Federation?
Were the materials she submitted independently verified? Did the report distinguish between individuals’ accounts and facts that had been independently verified?
Is your statement that Sheng was mentioned most often in the report accurate? If so, what specific counting method or statistical criteria supports that claim?
There is a fundamental difference between someone reporting harassment to a human rights organization and that organization independently verifying every claim made by the person. A report identifying someone as a victim of harassment does not establish that all attacks against them originated with the Chinese Communist Party, nor does it mean that all their critics are CCP agents.
The report itself acknowledges that many specific incidents could not be directly attributed to the Chinese authorities. Its overall assessment of a broader phenomenon cannot be expanded into definitive conclusions about every incident or every critic.
I would like you to explain whether you took the report's general assessment of harassment against overseas activists and applied it directly to Sheng's personal experiences, then extended that assessment to those who criticized her under their real names.
III. What Was the Basis for Andy Ellis's Assessment?
Your article quoted Andy Ellis, former Assistant Director of Operations at the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), as saying:
“I think she is a victim.”
He also stated:
“I strongly do. I think the Chinese government is trying to sully her reputation to advance their own interests.”
I would like to know what evidence supports his assessment that Sheng was a victim of a smear campaign by the Chinese Communist Party.
Was this based on specific incidents involving Sheng that he had personally investigated and verified, or on his professional assessment of the CCP's transnational influence and interference strategies?
There is a fundamental difference between the two. A security intelligence expert may conclude, based on professional experience, that a particular pattern of attack is consistent with the methods of a state actor. But that assessment does not automatically establish who was responsible for a specific incident, much less prove that everyone who criticized Sheng was connected to the Chinese Communist Party.
I have written separately to Amnesty International Canada and Andy Ellis, requesting clarification regarding the report's sources, whether Sheng participated in submitting materials, the verification procedures involved, and the evidentiary basis for the assessments cited in your article. As of now, I have received no response. I will continue to follow up and make the correspondence public as appropriate.
What I seek is not support for one side or the other, but clarification of specific facts and sources of information.
IV. Interviewing Critics Does Not Mean Fairly Representing Their Experiences and Evidence
In your follow-up article, you stated that you spent nearly a year working on the story, interviewed critics of Sheng Xue, and compiled a spreadsheet of 25 pages. However, interviewing people with differing views is not the same as fairly representing their arguments in the final report.
I still have the first email you sent me on April 19, 2018. In it, you described your research as focusing on Chinese democracy activists in Canada and the attacks they faced after publicly expressing opposition to the Chinese Communist Party. You said you had read my articles about Tibet and my criticism of the CCP and wanted to interview me. The email did not indicate that the interview would focus on the controversy surrounding Sheng Xue.
Yet during our in-person interview, whenever Sheng became the subject, you showed considerable interest and repeatedly pursued questions within the framework of Sheng being smeared by the Chinese Communist Party. I told you then that criticizing Sheng came at a cost. For example:
First, February 24, 2016. Chen Yonglin, a supporter of Sheng Xue, offered a $10,000 bounty in an email group for cutting out my tongue. Chen Yonglin was the former Chinese diplomat who defected to Australia and whom you later mentioned in your article.
Second, September 13, 2016. Wen Yunchao, another supporter of Sheng Xue, circulated sexually explicit fabricated images of me through multiple email groups. He cropped my portrait with the Dalai Lama and combined it with an image of the lower body of a sex worker to create and distribute a pornographic composite. You saw this image during our interview, yet your only response was: “Sheng’s photos have been Photoshopped, too.”
I am not denying that Sheng may have experienced similar attacks. My question is why you did not give my experience the same serious and careful attention.
Tang Danhong criticized your reporting for harming vulnerable individuals without sufficient evidence. She specifically pointed out that Zhu Rui had also been targeted with impersonation emails and pornographic photoshopped images, yet was insinuated to be a perpetrator in your article.
Woeser also noted that your article failed to mention the attacks Zhu Rui had suffered, while instead insinuating that Zhu was an attacker.
I am not asking you to take sides, nor am I asking you to accept every claim I make. I am asking that you apply the same standards of verification to the experiences of different individuals and treat materials from different sources with the same care and scrutiny.
You also interviewed other critics, including Fei Liangyong and Liu Shaofu, who answered your questions seriously and provided materials. Yet the final article portrayed Sheng as a victim of relentless smears, while the attacks, threats, and evidence presented by her critics were not given comparable attention.
If you believe the materials I provided were inaccurate, you could have investigated, verified them, and challenged them. But you cannot rely on Sheng's experiences as important evidence of a coordinated CCP campaign while disregarding the specific evidence I provided, and even leaving me in a position where I was implicitly suspected of being an attacker. This is not merely a matter of selecting information; it concerns whether journalism fairly represents the actual circumstances of the people it interviews.
V. A Significant Factual Issue Before Publication: Sheng Xue Spread False Information
Your article was published on April 1, 2019. Before that, Sheng Xue circulated a claim concerning the Dalai Lama's nomination of Wang Bingzhang for the Nobel Peace Prize. The claim was subsequently publicly clarified.
On March 11, 2019, Radio Free Asia published a report on the matter. On March 14, Yang Jianli and Xue Wei issued a factual clarification, explaining that the Dalai Lama had expressed support in principle for Wang Bingzhang receiving the prize, but had not explicitly agreed to personally nominate him. They also stated that they had cautioned Sheng at the time against publishing inaccurate information. On March 16, Sheng herself publicly apologized.
Thus, the relevant factual clarification had already been made public before your article was published.
This was directly relevant to Sheng's public statements and the credibility of the information she circulated, yet it was not addressed in your reporting.
Did you verify the information Sheng had circulated? Did you interview Yang Jianli, Xue Wei, or other people present at the time? Were you aware of the clarification made after verification by Voice of Tibet and the Office of the Dalai Lama?
If your article was intended to investigate a “smear campaign” against Sheng, why did it fail to address this significant factual issue that had already been publicly clarified before publication?
Journalism should not investigate only what a person claims to have suffered. It should also examine whether that person's public statements are accurate and whether criticism directed at them is supported by evidence.
VI. Journalistic Accountability: Address the Facts Instead of Labeling Critics
I acknowledge that the Chinese Communist Party has long subjected overseas dissidents to surveillance, intimidation, harassment, and transnational repression. These actions deserve exposure and condemnation. But what does that have to do with the specific criticism directed at Sheng Xue?
Questioning public statements, asking where donations have gone, examining political asylum claims, or asking public figures to explain their conduct does not amount to working for the Chinese Communist Party. Critics speaking under their real names must also be held accountable for the accuracy of their statements. But journalists have a responsibility to examine the evidence on both sides, rather than allowing political labels to replace fact-checking.
You may report on anonymous harassment suffered by Sheng and investigate whether the CCP was involved. But you cannot place verifiable sources of critics within a narrative of coordinated attacks by the CCP solely on the basis of experts' general assessments of the CCP's infiltration and influence strategies.
True journalistic objectivity does not mean constructing a complete victim narrative for one side. It means distinguishing between different kinds of conduct and examining every claim against the evidence.
I ask you and The New York Times to answer the following questions directly:Do you have evidence that Zhu Rui (me)and other critics who publicly criticized Sheng Xue under their real names were connected to anonymous harassment?
Do you have evidence that these critics were connected to a coordinated campaign by the Chinese Communist Party?
Did Sheng participate in Amnesty International's investigation conducted in 2016–2017, or submit materials? How were those materials verified?
What is the specific basis for your claim that Sheng was mentioned most often in the Amnesty International report?
What specific, verified facts support Andy Ellis's assessment that Sheng was a victim of a smear campaign by the Chinese Communist Party?
Why did your article fail to adequately present the facts, evidence, and experiences of attacks suffered by critics such as Zhu Rui, Fei Liangyong, and Liu Shaofu?
Why did your article fail to investigate or address the factual clarifications that had already been made public regarding the March 2019 incident involving the Dalai Lama and Wang Bingzhang?
I hope these questions will receive specific and direct answers, rather than being dismissed once again as evidence of “combative” behavior among overseas dissidents.
I also hope The New York Times will revisit this article and provide an appropriate explanation and correction for its factual omissions, insufficient evidence, and unfair portrayal.
As for you, Ms. Porter, I am not asking you to support me, nor am I asking you to agree with all my views about Sheng Xue. I ask only that you apply the same standards of evidence to every person involved and take responsibility for the facts and inferences presented in your reporting.
The authority of the press should not shield its reporting from factual scrutiny, and a journalist's professional standing should not exempt them from accountability.
Catherine Porter, I ask you to address these questions directly.










